Synchronizing Central and Regional Governments Following the 2024 Simultaneous Regional Elections: Challenges Regarding Representation and Regional Government Effectiveness in 2025

Authors

  • Samsudin Institut Pemerintahan Dalam Negeri

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.30656/pn6prx41

Keywords:

electoral integrity, state resources, level playing field, bureaucratic neutrality, electoral inequality

Abstract

Problem: Electoral integrity is determined not only by the voting and vote-counting processes but also by the fairness of the electoral playing field. Elections in Indonesia continue to face challenges related to unequal access to state resources, including public officials, government programs, public facilities, institutional communication, and administrative authority, which may generate electoral advantages for particular contestants.

Purpose: This study aims to analyze the forms of inequality in the use of state resources in Indonesian elections and to examine their implications for the level playing field and electoral integrity.

Methodology: This study employs a qualitative approach using document analysis. Data were drawn from official reports on the 2024 elections, publications of the General Elections Commission and the Election Supervisory Body, Constitutional Court decisions concerning disputes over the 2024 presidential election results, and scholarly literature on electoral integrity, abuse of state resources, level playing field, bureaucratic neutrality, and incumbency advantage. The analysis was conducted by mapping the forms of state-resource use, assessing the electoral advantages they may generate, and examining their impact on competitive equality.

Results/Findings: The study finds that the use of state resources may create state-resource electoral asymmetry, referring to structural inequality arising from unequal access to state capacity among electoral contestants. Such inequality may generate institutional resource advantage, weaken the level playing field, and undermine electoral integrity. However, not every use of government resources constitutes electoral misconduct, as governmental functions must continue during election periods. The central problem lies in the blurred boundary between governing and campaigning. This study proposes an electoral integrity–level playing field nexus and highlights the need to strengthen institutional neutrality, ensure transparency in the use of public resources, and establish clearer institutional boundaries between governmental functions and electoral interests.

Keywords: electoral integrity; state resources; level playing field; bureaucratic neutrality; electoral inequality

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References

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Dokumen dan Sumber Resmi

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Published

2026-09-14

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Articles